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Nabihah Maqbool

June 2018

The Role of Chinese Administrative Courts in Mediating Interregional Inequality
This paper evaluates the relationship between local administrative courts and regional
development in China from the 1990s onwards. Development in China differs by region, with
higher economic markers measured in southern and eastern regions. Explanations for these
variations include differences in history, culture, infrastructure, geography, and resource
concentration. Some regions have benefitted from the growth of specialized industries and
investments that contributed to development, without extensive government intervention.
Policies utilized by the Chinese central government to stimulate development include
deregulation, regional development plans, and decentralization of economic decisions.
Responding to inequality between regional development, particularly the gap between rural and
urban development, the Chinese government has promulgated several development plans
focusing on central and western regions.
One factor that has been studied for its role in strengthening institutions and governance
at the regional level is administrative courts. While current literature reviews the role of
administrative law and administrative litigation and its effect on corruption, rule of law, and
administrative reform, there are fewer measurements between the role of administrative litigation
and administrative oversight on economic development. Evidence indicates that the efficacy of
administrative courts differ by the wealth in a region; regions with a higher GDP correlate with a
higher level of judicial independence and greater responsiveness to administrative lawsuits. This
paper describes how administrative courts function, how they may correlate with economic
growth, and broader reflections on institutional capacity in China.
I. An Overview of Chinese Development
A. Regional Inequality in China
There is a higher level of development in China’s eastern and southern regions than the
western and central regions, both in gross domestic product, and in Human Development indices
that capture measures of life expectancy and education, in addition to per capita income.1 This
gap is a result of market advantages and historical and geographic circumstances.
The uneven regional development has been attributed to preferential economic treatment
during the initial era of market liberalization, and specialized markets that predated centralized
economic planning.2 China permitted non-state enterprises and foreign investments in specially
exempted zones during the 1970s and 1980s along the Eastern coast. When additional economic
regions in western and central China were liberalized after this period, they lagged in investment,
especially since lucrative industries were already established in other regions.
Historical development factors also played a role in the present day inequality in regional
development. Coastal regions benefitted from their proximity to rivers and the ease of
transporting goods along these natural routes. During the 1960s local economies had specialized
1

Fang Yang, Dingzhong Zhang, Chuanwang Sun, China’s Regional Balanced Development Based on the
Investment in Power Grid Infrastructure, 53 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS, 1551 (Nov 2015),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032115010369.
2
Demurger et. al, The Relative Contributions of Location and Preferential Policies in China’s Regional
Development: Being in the Right Place and Having the Right Incentives, 13 China Economic Review, 447 (2002),
http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/woo/Demurger-Sachs-Woo-Bao-Chang.LocationVsPolicy.CER.pdf.
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and established exchanges, creating local trade markets.3 These “macro-clusters” of markets
along the South and Eastern Regions had specialized industries, such as footwear in Wenzhou.4
These regions were competitive regionally and among state supported enterprises. The diversity
of niche markets within local economies continued as the Chinese government implemented
centralized development plans.
While the Eastern and Southern regions developed goods competitive within markets, the
western and central regions of China remained agrarian economies. Though the GDP of the
entire country grew, it was predominantly due to the manufacturing industry boom in the eastern
and southern regions at the turn of the century; the rural central and western region lagged. In
2009 the Central Party implemented “The Rise of Central China Plan,” emphasizing the growth
of agricultural grain exports, energy mineral mining, manufacturing, and technology.5 The plan
included incentives for foreign investors, including tax exemptions, preferential land use
policies, and priority status for infrastructure projects. For Western China, the Central Party
implemented development plan focused on tax incentives, including tax holidays for enterprises.6
B. Chinese Economic Growth and the Growth of Local Governance
In the World Economic Forum’s 2017 Report, China was ranked 28 of 138 for
competitiveness.7 The report surveyed executives who stated the largest obstacle to conducting
business was access to financing, more than political instability, or inefficient government
bureaucracy. The World Bank has ranked China as 78th in the world for doing business in
overall. This was a higher ranking that followed improvements that made it easier to start a
business, and pay taxes.8 China continues to aggressively pursue economic growth, with
economists and government officials expressing apprehension over the “middle income trap.”
Yet officials recognize that rate of GDP growth is not sustainable and is focusing on focusing on
equalizing regional development, and increased investments in untapped markets.9

3

Hilda C. Eitzen, Dilemmas of Diversification: Regional Economic Development And Business Industrial Clusters
in China and Kazakhstan, 4 JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS, 11 (Nov 2012),
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://duckduckgo.com/&httpsredir=1&article=
1087&context=jekem.
4
Id.
5
Nancy Huang, Joie Ma, Kyle Sullivan, Economic Development Policies for Central and Western China, CHINA
BUSINESS REVIEW, (Nov. 2010) https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/economic-development-policies-for-centraland-western-china.
6 Id.
7
Klaus Schwab The Global Competiveness Report 2016-2017, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 146 (2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2016-2017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport20162017_FINAL.pdf.
8
World Bank Group, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs Economy Profile China, WORLD BANK
(2018), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Profiles/Country/CHN.pdf.
9
Supra note 1.
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Concurrent with China’s economic growth and development plans are changes in
Chinese law, specifically the decentralization of the judiciary and growth of local decisionmaking.10 Regional governance is a key element of supervising regional development, and in
determining the allocation of resources and land.11 As economic activity increases within a
region, there is less capacity for the central state to continue top-down control in regulating
businesses, thus businesses increasingly rely local government for enforcement of business deals.
As regional economies grow, local governments and local judicial bodies play a larger role in
facilitating and regulating economic activity.12
II. Components of the Chinese Judicial and Administrative State
A. Growing Judicial Independence in China
The Chinese judicial system is the government body that upholds national law and
adjudicates complaints, and Chinese courts and administrative courts determine dispute
outcomes with independent reasoning.13 Despite the government’s statement of judiciary
independence the Chinese judiciary has deferred to other state actors; in a 1994 survey a third of
judges found “it is inappropriate for the court to offend administrative departments,” signaling

1010

Donald Clarke, Peter Murrell, Susan Whiting, “The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development,” in The
Roles of Law and Politics in China’s Development, 378 Guanghua Yu, Eds. (Springer, 2014),
http://econweb.umd.edu/~murrell/articles/ChinaInstitutions.pdf.
11
Chenggang Xu, Chinese Reforms and Chinese Regional Decentralization, POLICYDIALOGUE.ORG, 2 (Nov.2006),
http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Xu_Chinese_Reform_and_Chinese_Regional_Decentralization.pdf
12
Id.
13
Xin He, Judicial Innovation and Local Politics: Judicialization of Administrative Governance in East China, THE
CHINA JOURNAL, no 69, 20 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026304.
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their reluctance to challenge government agencies despite their role in adjudicating complaints.14
As the Chinese judiciary has developed, independence from other state actors has grown. This is
in part due to structural changes; previously courts were funded by the local party through the
local government, and party officials appointed court officials.15 However after the past decade
of judicial reforms, funding is no longer from the local government and instead is sourced from
the national budget. This change has been linked to fewer preferential decisions to the businesses
that contribute the most in taxes to local governments.16
The Chinese judicial branch has been growing in its autonomy beyond these structural
rearrangements. Randall Peerenboom notes that even in authoritarian contexts, courts “may
enjoy considerable independence,” particularly in commercial law if not political and civil
matters.17 Literature on court behavior indicates that while courts do not act entirely independent
of party interests, they are also not controlled or dominated by party interests.18 The result of this
relationship is rather than being subservient to the ruling party, courts are political actors that act
strategically to accrue power within the broader government system.19 The judiciary attempts to
create increase its authority, just as any other political actor does.20
According to scholar Xin He, the orthodox view of Chinese courts as passive agents no
longer reflects the role they play, particularly when translating law into local contexts.21 There
are hundreds of courts, from the China Supreme People’s Court to the provincial level. However
courts must balance the public and political perception as an independent government branch
that serves the people, while appearing to be “ in harmony” with the other elements of the
government and the Central Party.
Chinese courts establish their interlinked yet independent stance in a variety of ways.
Judgments made in favor of plaintiffs indicate favorable outcomes for individual citizens, so in
order to appear non-aligned with the plaintiffs or avoid the appearance of advancing the cause of
discrete interests groups, courts have increased the level of mediation and settlements between
parties.22 Courts may guide mediation towards a desired outcome agreed upon by the two parties,
rather than determining the outcome by law on their own authority. This practice of mediation
and dispute resolution helps courts isolate themselves from political actors who look for
favorable court rulings through court decrees.23
The political power of the judges within the party structure also affects the level of
interference in court’s independent judicial decision making; judges with higher rankings in the
party experiencing less external interference in the judgments. Additionally, the number of
14

Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjing Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 51 THE CHINA
JOURNAL, 81 (Jan. 2004), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.2307/3182147?journalCode=tcj.
15
Supra note 13 at 25.
16
Id.
17
Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 3
(2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1543003.
18
Supra note 13 at 25, “there is room for courts to maneuver in the current political structure.”
19
Id.
20
Xiaohong Yu, “Rise of Local Courts in China: Judicial Hierarchy, Institutional Adaptation and Regime
Resilience”, paper presented at the conference “China’s Changing Courts”, Columbia University Law School, 2009,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026304.
21
Supra note 13 at 20.
22
Id. at 25.
23
Ji Li, Suing the Leviathan-An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of Administrative Litigation in China, J.
OF
EMPIRICAL
STUDIES,
Vol
10
Issue
4,
825
(Dec.
2013)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102369.
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judges in all courts has increased, from 60,000 in 1981, to over 190,000 in 2004, providing
greater judicial capacity to hear disputes.24 The professionalization of Chinese judges has also
been standardized; in 1987 only 17% of judges had junior college degrees, but as of 2000 it was
a requirement in order to serve as a judge. Notably, provinces that have more judges with higher
legal education have more legal hearings.
B. The Chinese Administrative State and Oversight
The Chinese administrative system, and judicial system more broadly, adheres to a codebased regime.25 Unlike common law, code law is a comprehensive list of law and enforcement,
which may lead to less need for judicial arbitration and interpretation. The second characteristic
of the Chinese administrative system is its comprehensive scope. The Chinese administrative
state intersects with almost every element of a citizen and corporation’s existence. One of the
salient characteristics of administrative states within developing countries is that they act as the
primary nexus between the private citizen and the state. As noted by Tom Ginsburg, a number of
essential rights are determined by the administrative state, rather than through constitutions.26 In
China separate administrative courts function in 31 regions.
Accompanying this large authority is a variety of checks and instances for review of an
administrative agency’s actions. The first is legislative supervision; the National People’s
Committee (“NPC”) provides the budget for administrative agencies, appoints and removes
officials, and investigates the agency’s actions.27 The NPC also has direct oversight over the
substance of an agency’s actions by issuing their own interpretations of legislation as guidelines
for agencies, and by reviewing local rules for consistency with those interpretations. The
Discipline Committee system, established in 1993, oversees administrative officials in
rulemaking and in particular acts executed by an agency.28 The Discipline Committee has the
authority to investigate, conduct discovery, and punish agency officials. Despite these official
capacities, the Discipline Committee’s actions are still far from providing robust oversight
authority, the committee requires approval for major acts, and has been noted to lack in funding
and staff to fully carry out its mandate.29
The Ministry of Supervision has the role to oversee and prevent agency excess and
30
abuses. However, like the Discipline Committee it is understaffed, and focuses on high-ranking
party officials. Finally the Procuratorate, the investigatory and prosecutor arm of the
24

Yuhua Wang, When Do Authoritarian Rules Tie Their Hands: The Rise of Limited Rule of Law in Sub-National
China,
PhD
dissertation,
University
of
Michigan,
15
(2011),
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/86417/wangyh_1.pdf;sequence=1.
25
Albert H. Y. Chen, Reflections on Administrative Law in China: A Hong Kong Perspective, UNIVERSITY OF HONG
KONG, (Sept 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474739.
26
Tom Ginsburg, "The Judicialization of Administrative Governance: Causes, Consequences and Limits,"
in Administrative Law and Governance in Asia: Comparative Perspectives, Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds.
(Routledge, 2008) https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/86417/wangyh_1.pdf;sequence=1.
27
Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency, and the Limits of Law, 161 Berkeley, J. Int’l L, 228 (Apr.
2001),
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://duckduckgo.com/&httpsredir=1&article=12
00&context=bjil.
28
Id. at 230.
29
Id.
30
Ji Li, Dare You to Sue the Tax Collector-An Empirical Study of Administrative Lawsuits against Tax Agencies in
China, PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 57, 65 (2014).
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government, is deputized to take on an oversight role of all agencies. Findings against agencies
are difficult to substantiate since agency officials may cite their discretion in any actions the
agency pursues, and additional pressure from the legislature or other party officials are necessary
in order to bring a case to investigation.31
Individuals and entities may challenge administrative decisions directly through
administrative reconsideration, a zero-cost process by which individuals challenge an agency
through a designated entity authorized to provide reconsideration decisions. But reconsideration
agencies are a part of the larger administrative state, and are not sufficiently independent from
the agency under review to provide unbiased reviews of an agency’s actions. There is also no
requirement for reconsideration entities to conduct a hearing, and the rights of the party making a
complaint like reviewing the evidence provided by the defending administrative agency, are
rarely enforced.32 Despite it being free and faster than administrative litigation, individuals are
less likely to prevail in administrative reconsideration cases, so it is a less used supervisory check
over agencies.
Finally, in an attempt to increase participation in administrative rule making in December
2017, the State Council of China passed rules allowing for public input into rulemaking. In
addition to proposals that may be submitted to agencies, agencies must provide forums for the
public to comment on new rules.33 However the requirement to solicit public comments does not
necessitate the agencies will take them into account in forming their final rules, particularly
because there is no comment period required for agencies to respond to the public.
C. Administrative Courts
While it has been argued that the weak position of the judiciary relative to the other
political actors in China means there is little role for courts in development, in reality the courts,
and specifically administrative courts, are becoming more significant actors at the regional
level.34 As a part of the expansive administrative state, administrative courts act as both
interpretive and enforcing regimes over a wide variety of issues; they have jurisdiction over
administrative litigation cases involving labor disputes, worker’s rights, land disputes,
environmental claims.35 Given the tepid success of administrative oversight agencies discussed
above, there has been an expansion in and growth of administration litigation.
1. Administrative Litigation
The Administrative Litigation Law, also known as the Administrative Procedure Law,
was passed in 1990 and allows for review of the legality of an administrative act and agency
rules.36 Article 11 of the Administrative Litigation Law specifies the procedure, jurisdiction, and

31

Id.
Supra note 27.
33
Shen Kui, Participatory Rulemaking in China Needs Even More Effort, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (Apr. 9, 2018)
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/04/09/shen-participatory-rulemaking-china/.
34
Supra note 10 at 401.
35
Randall Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts, Legalized Governance Judicialization and Dejudicialization in
China, 7, (Sept. 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract =1265147.
36
Supra note 30 at 67.
32
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judge’s role in adjudicating administrative laws in China.37 Under the law, administrative
agencies may be challenged in court, and the number of administrative cases has increased ten
times between its passage in 1990 to 2009.38
Following the Administrative Litigation Law, other administrative statutes were passed to
regulate state compensation, administrative appeals, licensing, and rulemaking.39 Sector specific
statutes were also passed to regulate environmental protection, land use, taxes, banking, and
securities.40 In addition to laws curtailing administrative discretion, two State Council directives
were issued requiring administrative decisions to align with statutes, further limiting agency
discretion.41 However in 2007, the Central Party’s Administrative Department issued a statement
encouraging administrative disputes to be settled, which Xin He argues is contrary to the intent
behind the passage of the Administrative Litigation Law, and would result in less administrative
litigation and challenges of administrative agencies.42
No agency law may be challenged before the rule is put into place as a specific
application of a law must be challenged.43 Citizens may now challenge an administrative court
for not “protecting one’s rights of the person and of property,” widening the scope of potential
administrative litigation cases.44 Second, the Administrative Litigation Law puts the burden of
proof on the defendant, thereby making the government responsible for proving the
administrative procedures taken before the court.45 The Administrative Litigation Law allows
citizens to petition for administrative review of an agency’s actions.46 Under Article 65 of the
Administrative Litigation Law, citizens may take government officials to court to challenge how
an administrative agency behaves, and courts may issue non-binding judicial suggestions.47
Judicial suggestions are informal communications between the court and government
organizations. These suggestions set time limits for responses, after which agencies must inform
the court what steps they have taken to fulfill the recommendations. Courts may choose to report
agency officials to the Party Disciplinary Department, which has the power to terminate an
official’s role. Through this chain, despite acting as a non-binding recommendation, courts still
exert indirect authority over the careers of individual bureaucrats if they fail to respond to the
court’s rulings. Beyond disciplining agencies, judicial suggestions are recommendations and
guidelines; by issuing them, courts act in an advisory role.48 Article 65 of the Administrative
Litigation Law allows administrative courts to automatically transfer funds from the
administrative agency if they refuse to pay the amount levied from a decision, ensuring
enforcement of financial penalties. 49
Administrative courts may require an agency chief to appear in court when summoned; in
some regions, agency chiefs who miss two administrative court summons are dismissed from
37

Bixin Jiang, Review of Adminsitrative Decisions of Government by Chinese Courts, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2, http://www.aihja.org/images/users/1/files/china.en.0.pdf.
38
Supra note 13 at 20.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Supra note 13 at 24..
42
Supra note 23 at 832.
43
Supra note 33.
44
Supra note 37.
45
Id.
46
Article 37, P.R.C. Administrative Litigation Law, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-10/29/content _1499268.htm.
47
Supra note 13 at 66.
48
Id. at 41.
49
Supra note 37 at 2.
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their position.50 Some of these appearances are also broadcasted on regional and national
television stations. In Nantong, there was a forty percent increase in agency officials appearing in
court after broadcasting began.51 The increase in public visibility of administrative officials may
contribute to greater accountability and better administration.
The inclusion of agency officials in the courtroom, judicial suggestions, and media
coverage of administrative court proceedings and statements by agency representatives, elevates
the perception of the court’s importance and authority.52 The combined usage of these actions
allows courts to coax agencies to behave according to the court’s wishes, without outwardly
compelling them to do so.
2. Features of Administrative Courts and Plaintiffs
The composition and features of judges in administrative courts also determine the
relative power they have in enforcing compliance from administrative agencies. Unlike the civil
courts that have a backlog of pending cases, there are sufficient administrative courts to provide
timely administrative court hearings and the addition of judges does not resolve any underlying
issue in terms of a lack of capacity to take on cases.53 However, only 22.5% of administrative
court cases had an attorney represent the plaintiff; only 3.1% of attorneys conduct administrative
litigation work. So while there are sufficient administrative judges for each case, there may be a
lack of attorneys familiar with administrative litigation available to represent clients in cases.54
One factor related to the professionalization of judges is an increased sympathies
expressed for disadvantaged plaintiffs, which is may be expressed through more favorable
rulings for individuals who challenge agencies.55 Second, regions in China with greater
economic development have more judges with advanced degrees, and a higher level of
sophistication in advancing innovative approaches to judicial opinions that encourage agencies to
comport with the court’s rulings.
Administrative court oversight may also be more specialized, like the China Securities
Regulation Commission, which enforces regulations through administrative court hearings.56
Administrative decisions were relied upon in part because there was a lack of expertise for civil
courts to hear these cases. The use of administrative courts has allowed for “firm-specific”
solutions in complicated cases.57
There is a measurable difference in agencies able successfully defend themselves in
courts based on their power. Two agencies rarely lose to plaintiffs, the tax bureau, and the Public
Security Bureau, the nation’s police agency.58 In 2008 the Public Security Bureau, responsible
for all national police forces, did not lose a single case brought before the administrative courts.59
50

Supra note 13 at 29.
Supra note 13 at 29.
52
Supra note 13 at 17.
53
Supra note 23 at 825.
54
Id. at 827.
55
Supra note 13 at 34.
56
Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, Governing Emerging Stock Markets: Legal v. Administrative Governance,
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE,
Volume
13,
no
1,
8
(Jan.
2005)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=645423.
57
Id. at 9.
58
Supra note 23 at 825, citing Nantong Intermediate Court where the Public Security Bureau did not lose once in
2008; Supra note 30 at 70.
59
Supra note 13 at 34.
51
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A similar trend exists in the willingness of plaintiffs to bring cases against powerful agencies.
Citizens are more reluctant to sue major agencies like the tax bureaus, assuming either a
likelihood of failure, or an inability to have the opinion enforced.60 Additionally, repeat
interactions with an administrative agency deters entities from wanting to counter the agency. If
a citizen or business expects a long relationship with an agency they are less likely to bring an
administrative suit.61
III. Administrative Litigation and Regional Development
Administrative cases have increased from 12,000 cases in 1990 to over 120,000 cases per
year in 2009.62 However, researchers note that the number of cases brought before administrative
law courts may not capture the full number of administrative battles, as many are mediated and
settled out of court.63 The number of cases brought forth generally correlated with the level of
economic development in the region.
A. Administrative Litigation by Region

64

60

Supra note 30 at 58.
Supra note 30 at 84.
62
Supra note 13 at 24.
63
Supra note 23 at 832, citing Tom Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis
of
Japan’s
Turn
to
Litigation,
35
J.
OF
LEGAL
STUDIES,
55
(Jan.
2006),
http://home.uchicago.edu/~tginsburg/pdf/articles/TheUnreluctantLitigant.pdf.
64
Supra note 30 at 84.
61
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The number of attorneys per capital in Beijing is double that of other provinces who have
a similar GDP.65 There are a disproportionate number of attorneys who participate in
administrative law cases compared to other provinces – though the number of attorneys in
Beijing is proportional to the number of national administrative agencies located in the region.
In the 2006 City of Nantong in the Eastern region of Jiangsu, chief officials who failed to
appear before the court began to be censured in their party performance assessment. The censure
created an incentive to comply with administrative court summons, thereby securing more
authority of courts over administrative parties.66 All 126 judicial suggestions that have been
issued by the Nantong courts have received positive feedback, or have been implemented.67 By
2009, in half the administrative law cases in the province, the plaintiffs either prevailed or settled
with the government.
By contrast, Henan, a province in central China, has a history of administrative agencies
discouraging rural villagers from filing administrative complaints. In one account a resident was
detained by Security forces for advertising information about tax policy that he had read in the
newspaper.68 In administrative tax litigation there was only an 11.7% success rate for plaintiffs.69
One element involved in the Henan province tax litigation is the relative wealth of those
with claims against tax collectors; low-income citizens have little of their income taxed, and few
reasons to make appeals before the court.70 Due to fees leveraged by tax assessors, corporations
have a larger incentive to challenge tax agencies in court. A feature of tax cases in the Henan is
that the state will hire lawyers as their attorneys to defend the tax bureau’s decisions. These same
administrative lawyers later appear as attorneys for corporate plaintiffs. The repeat actor in
administrative tax cases is not the corporation challenging the tax assessment, but the attorneys
representing their interests. As a result, these attorneys are more likely to encourage their
corporate clients to settle or enter mediation with the tax bureau with whom attorneys have a
relationship, capturing favorable settlements for their client.71
B. How Regional Development Affects Administrative Litigation
The economic development, dominance of an industry, and control by bureaucrats of
administrative matters determine the responsiveness of administrative courts to administrative
litigation. The frequency of administrative litigation in turn, reflects the existing development
within a region and the judicial independence of the courts from administrative agencies.
In an empirical sampling of administrative court complaints from the Legal Affairs
Office, there was a higher ratio of administrative lawsuits per 10,000 people along the entire East

65

Id.
Supra note 13 at 22.
67
Id. at 34; one response by the Industry and Commerce Bureau read in part, “Later this month, we will further
launch a city-wide review of legal enforcement practices, and rectify problematic practices within the time limits.”
68
Supra note 14 at 78.
69
Supra note 30 at 68.
70
Supra note 30 at 84.
71
Supra note 30 at 108; “With state agencies being their major clients, administrative law attorneys, when
representing the plaintiffs, cannot constantly be zealous guards of their client's legal interests, and may persuade the
plaintiffs to settle even when a trial would be more beneficial.”
66
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coast of China’s border, with the highest number in Shandong Province.72 This indicates that
administrative litigation, like business litigation, increases with GDP.
According to Xin He, the less developed a region, the less administrative law will be
utilized as a means of resolving disputes. This is because of a lack of resources available to
commit to ensuring an independent judicial process, rather than courts that may dismiss claims.73
Second, when a category of cases intersects with the sector of the economy driving development
in a region, the administrative courts are less likely to hear those cases. For instance, in areas in
which real estate is driving local growth, the administrative court are less likely to accept real
estate cases for judicial hearings.74
It is easier for bureaucrats to retaliate against plaintiffs for bringing administrative
lawsuits in rural provinces, since there are fewer administrative agents with broader control, who
more easily communicate with other administrative departments about litigants. Retaliation
against individuals is more difficult for administrative agents in urban areas as they have limited
authority since they are one of numerous agents, making them less likely to interact with the
same individuals on a repeat basis.75 Unlike rural administrators, urban administrators have less
authority and have experience more oversight over their actions, and thereby have less discretion
to abuse their power. This may play a factor in the willingness of individuals to bring complaints
against administrators by creating an expectation that bureaucrats and administrative agencies
will be held accountable for their actions.
Overall there is a correlation between urban areas and higher levels of administrative
litigation. It has not been determined whether administrative courts have created more responsive
state agencies, leading to higher GDP growth and development, or if a state with a high GDP has
lead to a stronger administrative courts and agencies. Likely both of these relationships are
occurring simultaneously. Further emphasis by the Central Party on regional development will
demonstrate whether administrative agencies treat all actors equally and follow established
judicial reasoning, and determine the quality of development when bolstered by institutional
capacity of administrative agencies and responsive judiciaries.
There is little effect seen between the presence of foreign investments and administrative
litigation. It may be that foreign companies are less likely to violate or challenge administrative
laws.76 However external investors may dictate the level of administrative court activity without
directly bringing administrative cases. When investors rely on contract enforcement, local
officials are more likely to comply with administrative court hearings. Yuhua Wang argues that
investors have formed a new constituent group that courts serve, and that when administrative
court decisions intersect with business interests, agencies are more deferential to court
decisions.77 Based on these trends, it is likely there will be an increase in administrative
decisions as urbanization occurs in rural areas; businesses will pursue favorable rulings through
administrative litigation.
A final important component in understanding the rise of administrative lawsuits is that
institutional changes take time; it will take time to adjust the culture sufficient for individuals to
72

Supra note 23 at 827.
Supra note 13 at 34.
74
Id. at 34.
75
Supra note 23 at 831.
76
Supra note 23 at 840; “In sum, the regression results cast doubt on the efficacy of the top-down reforms intended
to improve the administrative litigation system. Scholars should shift their attention to the power structure at the
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feel comfortable suing agencies, rather than assuming agencies are immune to challenges.78
Wealth itself is also a factor in creating a more accountable state; as the resources in China grow
at an individual and institutional level, more investments can be made to ensure an independent
and robust administrative state from internal mechanisms and external challenges.79 Better
administrative courts may be dependent on greater economic growth, and more economic growth
will likely lead to increased administrative litigation.80
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